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Introduction
Short question, short answer: Yes, the so-called
“staatliche Rettungsplan” (State Rescue Plan) for
Opel, as suggested by Merkel’s government, has
failed – spectacularly.And that it has failed is good!
What is the reason for this seemingly harsh judge-
ment? To provide a plausible answer, the following
two questions will be addressed below, namely,
• Whether basically a government plan to “save”
Opel would have been acceptable, both in terms
of Germany’s basic regulatory framework,its free
market and industrial policy? and
• How Opel – if at all possible – could have been
saved within the policy framework of a free mar-
ket system?
First a critical – more semantic rather than econom-
ic – remark on the media spectacle surrounding what
was referred to as “saving Opel”. Basically it should
be noted that the state is not capable of “saving” a
single enterprise, unless it is nationalised and main-
tained at the taxpayers’ expense.As long as the con-
cerned enterprise still has to assert itself vis-à-vis
competition, it is simply inaccurate to equate the
willingness or non-willingness of the state with “sav-
ing” or “not saving” the endangered enterprise – in
this case Opel. What incredible confusion and
decline, both linguistically and in terms of the free
market! With all political sides assuming the lan-
guage of the media in an effort to attract voters – by
equating government credit for Opel with saving
Opel – expectations were aroused amongst the Opel
workers and the public vis-à-vis the government that
do not exist in a free market system. All the more
painful was the slap in the face for German politics
when in the end GM refused to sell Opel.
In a nutshell: in the long rung government subsidies
alone have never been able to save a company and
jobs.That was not even possible in the former GDR.
In the end only wise management, committed and
productive employees, and, of course, high-quality
and saleable products – products that are reasonably
priced and competitive – can save a company. The
long-term failure of Opel and especially the abrupt
financial problems of the GM subsidiary are indica-
tors that several of these conditions were clearly not
fulfilled. It was gross negligence on the part of
German politicians not to criticise the media’s equa-
tion of subsidy with saving from the very beginning.
Is government support for Opel acceptable?
Now to the core questions:would governmental sup-
port for Opel have been acceptable in terms of the
free market system and within the German regulato-
ry framework?
For free-market purists – and not for automotive
experts – the answer to this question can only be a
clear no! The arguments are obvious:
• The markets in the Western industrial countries
are to a large degree saturated; all of the auto-
mobile manufacturers located here suffer gener-
ally from high overcapacities of between 20 and
30 percent and cut-throat price wars. To wit: a
competitive war of extermination, similar to that
described in a textbook on oligopoly, is going on
now; a market clearing is unavoidable and weak
producers will be eliminated. According to those
critical of the economic recovery plan, it rightly
affects Opel as the clearly weakest market partic-
ipant.The government’s recovery plan was aimed
at preventing this from happening.
• Government structural subsidies – if they are un-
avoidable – should only be aimed at a mitigation
of the overall negative economic and employ-
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ment effects of a necessary structural change, not
at its prevention by structural preservation. The
goal of the federal government was, however, not
to cushion Opel’s exit from the market but to pre-
vent it by providing guarantees for all of Opel’s
German locations without reducing the number
of employees. This contradicted both the criteria
for welfare as well as the rules governing Euro-
pean policy on competition.
• The government sought out the investor promis-
ing the fewest changes in employment numbers,
not the best investor for the future of Opel. The
federal government was thus seeking a short-term
political solution,not a long-term market-oriented
and operational solution.When,after Frau Merkel’s
political decision in favour of Magna, the respected
economic experts in the trust transaction – Dirk
Pfeil and Manfred Wennemer – were replaced or
resigned in protest,it was a PR fiasco for Merkel’s
government. Both gentlemen deserve credit for
their firm stance on behalf of regulatory policy
within a free market system vis-à-vis the tactical
politics motivated by the election.
• Government subsidies that accompany an inevita-
ble structural change in an industrial sector should
not aim at individually selected companies but
must safeguard the principle of equality for sector
members in accordance with regulatory policy. In
this example financial guarantees would have to be
made available not only to Opel but also to the
automobile manufacturers Ford,Volkswagen,BMW
and Daimler.This did not happen.
• Finally, if the German government decides that
Opel should be carved out of GM and sold to 
a new investor, taking a dowry of around EUR 
4.5 billion with it; if it persuades the parent com-
pany GM to practically give away its property,
namely Opel, to the best investor while retaining
35 percent via a neutral trust company,then it has
to follow the rules of the game.The chancellor did
not do that. By settling on Magna as the investor
prematurely against the declared preferences of
GM for RHJI, the government not only violated
the rules of fair competition between several
potential investors but also infringed upon GM’s
reservation of ownership. In the German legal
system it is not possible to sell something that one
does not own.
As was expected by strategists, GM decided on 4
November 2009 to keep Opel as a technology asset
instead of giving it away to Magna and a Russian
bidder.This stopped all the sins against the Germany
regulatory framework of a free-market system that
all the state-supporting parties within and outside
federal responsibility as well as the heads of the
Länder regardless of their political hue had been
committing for decades.
It is to Edward Withacre that Merkel’s government
owes its thanks for committing one less sin.On 4 Sep-
tember 3009 he prevented GM’s board from selling
Opel to Magna.This spectacular event should be ex-
amined more closely as it is important for the future
of Opel.
The 68-year-old Texan was selected personally by
President Barack Obama at the end of June 2009,
shortly before the end of the six-week insolvency
phase of the old General Motors as the head of the
board of directors of the new General Motors.
Withacre,called “Big Ed”,was already in retirement.
Previously he was the successful and tough CEO of
AT&T, which he turned into one the world’s largest
American communication corporations.
Coming from outside the industry,Withacre candidly
announced at the very beginning that he knew noth-
ing about automobiles. As experience shows, this is
not a criterion for being nominated to the highest
GM management level.What counted was his strate-
gic vision and his ability to lead even small compa-
nies to success on a large scale.And thus to turn the
USD 70 billion of taxpayer’s money that Obama’s
government spent on saving GM, the national flag-
ship company, into a successful investment.
The plan of the old GM management and Merkel’s
government to sell Opel failed. The board of direc-
tors of the new GM under Ed Withacre decided on 4
November 2009 to keep Opel as a European bastion,
to restructure and revitalize it on their own.A speedy
reorganisation plan was promised by GM, also the
repayment of the financial funds provided by the
German government within the agreed time limit.
The problem of equal competition
The second question remains. Are the critics right,
and even if conflict with the EU subsidy criteria due
to the one-sided focus on German locations were
avoided, should a government subsidy for Opel be
objected to in principle on the basis of equal compe-
tition within the German industrial regulatory
framework?Here the answer is not as clearly negative in a free-
market framework as to the first question.First of all
it must be considered that with the market exit of
Opel not only 25,000 employees would have lost
their jobs with Opel in Germany but at least anoth-
er two to three further jobs per employee would
have been greatly endangered all along the supply
chain. If, based on a conservative estimate, we as-
sume for Germany alone a total of 50,000 endan-
gered jobs, this corresponds, including families, etc.,
to the population of an average city that would be
affected by Opel’s market exit.
To avoid misunderstandings: jobs alone can and must
not be the reason for delaying an inevitable market
clearing with taxpayers’ money. In this case the social
costs of an artificial extension of Opel’s existence using
tax money would be greater than the social benefit of
reallocating the workforce. Using tax money for the
purpose of “saving” a single enterprise – independent
of its size and its impact on employment – is only eco-
nomically justifiable if the company in question has,
firstly,sufficient substance and prospects for the future
and secondly if its financial plight was caused by unfor-
tunate circumstances and not by itself.A hypothetical
example of this would be a parent group of companies
whose long-term miss-management resulted not only
in its own but also in its European subsidy’s downfall.
How that happened – whether because of incapable
management, a misguided policy model or financial
bleeding through internal pricing – is inconsequential.
What remains is either a market exit or turning to the
government for financial support.
Opel’s case is in many respects similar to the above
example.At least in terms of the second requirement
for government support is met: sufficient substance
and prospects for the company future.Within the au-
tomotive industry it is clear that Opel with its 700 en-
gineers has an excellent international development
centre. In the past the corporate group’s headquar-
ters in Detroit profited considerably from its know-
how in the US domestic market but its performance
was hardly or not at all paid for in the last few years.
This is one of the reasons for Opel’s malaise. How
important this development centre is for the GM
corporate group can be seen by the fact that GM
wants to retain its subsidiary to secure for itself a
slight chance of survival in the American market. If
Opel as an old German car manufacturer with a long
tradition had disappeared from the market, it would
have been a bitter loss for automobile know-how in
its German industrial location.
Conclusions
Thus, with this technological potential Opel has suf-
ficient substance as an enterprise to compete inde-
pendently in highly competitive markets. Opel only
needs the chance to show that it can. Other manu-
facturers, such as Volkswagen, Ford, Renault,
Peugeot and Fiat, etc., must first prove that they are
better.Which company and which brand will survive
is decided in the end by the market, not by a civil
servant in the economics ministry or with the cartel
authorities. To the contrary, a highly productive Opel
will most certainly increase competition in the auto-
mobile markets – for the benefit of the consumers.
That is the way the free market system functions,even
if some professors of business economics that focus
on the automotive industry don’t think this is the case.
Space limitations do not allow me to go into detail
here on GM’s new financial rescue plan. The fact is
that there are considerable strategic weaknesses at
Opel that must be attended to by the new GM man-
agement: inconsistencies in the European organisa-
tion of its locations – in the meantime the new Opel
CEO Nick Reilly has announced the closure of the
Antwerp factory – the one-sided focus on the saturat-
ed western European market, the gaps in its pro-
grammes for models and motors, etc.All these weak-
nesses,however,have to be blamed on GM’s misman-
agement of the past. It is important for Opel to be
able to take its future in its own hands and to decide
independently on company strategy.It is now conven-
tional wisdom in the global automobile industry that
companies with a production volume of only EUR 1.5
billion units are too small to survive in the long term
on the global market. In this respect Opel as a part of
GM is a basic requirement worth considering. An-
other important step would be a stronger financial
participation in a future Adam Opel AG on the part
of a committed and highly-motivated workforce and
its distributors – both stakeholders that have a strong
interested in a secure future for Opel. Unfortunately,
to date none of these steps has been taken!
These suggestions would set the course for the
future, but the company itself has to steer the boat –
the government can’t help here! How successful a
company can be in a large group despite a dominant
parent company is evidenced with unusual clarity by
Audi – also the model for Porsche integration.
Should GM develop as Volkswagen has with its 
10 brands – with Ed Withacre there is hope – the
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chances would be high that the Cinderella of today
could turn into, if not the daughter of a queen, at
least an attractive woman.Thus it would be possible
to find one day an attractive husband to start “the
economies of scale” by own means. This would be
desirable for all Opel employees after all they have
gone through in the last thirty years of continual
decline. Nothing is better for success than success!